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Through case studies and empirical analysis, scholars have uncovered convincing evidence
that individual donors influence lending decisions of international financial institutions (IFIs) such
as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  Less clear are the mechanisms by which
donors exert influence.  Potential mechanisms are either formal or informal.  Formal influence is
through official decisions of the board of executive directors while informal influence covers all
other channels.  This paper explores the role of informal influence at the Asian Development Bank
by examining the flow of funds after loans are approved.  Controlling for commitments (loan
approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the interests of the key shareholders, Japan and
the U.S.?  I compare these findings with results for the World Bank and consider implications for
institutional reforms.
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Recent years have seen a rising chorus of calls for the reform of international financial
institutions (IFIs).  With major shifts in the world economy–chiefly, the rise of the BRIC
economies–the main focus of reform has been changing the governance structure of IFIs to reflect
the new economic reality.  The notion that the G7 (and especially the U.S.) exert too much control
has been reenforced by a wave of studies demonstrating systematic donor influence over IFIs (Dreher
et al., 2009A,B; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999).  These studies
document behavior that violates the IFIs' apolitical charters and substantiate a perceived lack of
independence that undermines IFI effectiveness (Rodrik, 1995).
Less attention has been given to the pathways through which donors exert influence over IFIs.
The focus on voting shares emphasizes the importance of formal governance structures and there is
some work corroborating this view.  Stone (2004), for example, illustrates the workings of donor
influence through formal channels in the case of IMF program interruptions.  Yet there is also ample
evidence of informal influence such as bargains struck during periodic financial negotiations, e.g.,
International Development Association (IDA) replenishments in the case of the World Bank and
Asian Development Fund (ADF) replenishments in the case of  the Asian Development Bank
(ADB).  Most of the empirical research on the political economy of IFIs examines outcomes
(commitments, disbursements, the probability of loan approval, the number of loans) that could
reflect a combination of formal and informal influence.
Understanding the mechanisms through which donors exert influence is critical for effective
institutional reform.  To examine these mechanisms, Kilby (2010) attempts to isolate the impact of
informal influence in the disbursement of World Bank loans.  In the World Bank (as in other
multilateral development banks), the board of directors approves new loans and credits2
("commitments") but the decision to disburse committed funds officially rests with operational staff.
Exploiting this feature, Kilby explores whether measures of donor interests correlate with
disbursements to a recipient country–after controlling for the size of that country's loan portfolio (i.e.,
the cumulative commitments for all active projects).  Donors have formal influence over
commitments (since commitments reflect board loan approval decisions) but, conditional on these
commitments, have only informal influence over subsequent disbursement decisions.  In the case of
the World Bank, Kilby finds substantial post-approval informal donor influence.  This suggests that
reforms focused exclusively on formal governance structures may well have limited impact on the
actual behavior of the World Bank and that deeper changes, such as moving the location of
headquarters and radically revising staff incentive systems, may be necessary.
Regional development banks are by-and-large modeled on the World Bank but with
important differences, differences that may alter the role of informal influence and possibly shed
light on how donors exert control in IFIs.  The World Bank and the ADB differ in a number of
important respects.  In the World Bank, the U.S. has more formal power than any other country with
16.36 percent of the overall vote in the IBRD; Japan is second with 7.85 percent of the vote.  In
contrast, Japan and the U.S. by design are tied for the top spot in the ADB with 12.756 percent of
the vote each.  Voting itself differs between the institutions.  In the World Bank, executive directors
representing more than one member country must cast their votes as a bloc while ADB executive
directors are free to apportion their votes according to the wishes of the individual countries they
represent.  The president of the World Bank has always been American while the president of the
ADB has always been Japanese.  Finally, the World Bank is headquartered in the U.S., some two
blocks from the White House while the ADB is headquartered in Manilla, 3000 kilometers from
Tokyo and 14,000 kilometers from Washington, DC.   Not surprisingly, past research has found that3
the U.S. plays a unique role within the World Bank (Gwin, 1997; Woods, 2003) while Japan and the
U.S. share the spotlight within the ADB (Kilby, 2006).
There is also important case study evidence of differences in donor influence between the
institutions.  As Anwar (2006, 16) points out:  "In the case of Pakistan, anecdotal evidence shows
differences in institutional lending behavior over time. For example, the ADB continued its lending
to Pakistan throughout the 1990s even as the World Bank and IMF disengaged their lending
operations due to the US-led sanctions that had been imposed on the country, and had made it
difficult for these institutions to gain clearance from their boards."  Anwar also finds that the ADB
did not raise its lending to Pakistan after 9-11 while the concessional window of the World Bank did.
The goal of this study is to examine the informal influence of Japan and the U.S. in the ADB.
Section II reviews the relevant literature on Japan, the U.S., and the ADB.  Section III develops a
framework for examining the influence of donors on post-approval disbursement decisions.  Section
IV presents and describes the data used in the analysis.  Section V discusses the estimation procedure
and results.  Section VI is a brief conclusion.
II.  Background
At its founding in 1966, the ADB was consciously modeled on the World Bank.  While the
U.S. had dominated the World Bank in a number of ways (Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen, 2006;
Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kilby 2009A), in the ADB the role of dominate donor is shared by Japan and
the United States.  There is substantial anecdotal evidence of influence over lending, policy, and
staffing decisions (Krasner, 1981; Upton, 2000; Wihtol, 1988) and empirical evidence of influence
over lending (Kilby, 2006).
In the broader aid allocation literature, researchers have found geopolitical and commercial4
interests particularly important for the U.S. (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), commercial interests central
for Japan (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dippel, 2009; Schraeder et al., 1998; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004;
Tuman et al., 2001; Tuman and Strand, 2006) and humanitarian concerns foremost for the "like-
minded" donor countries, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Alesina and
Dollar, 2000; Stokke, 1989).  One strand of the literature on Japanese bilateral aid explores Japanese
policy as a reaction to U.S. pressure (gaiatsu).  Hickman (1993) and Tuman and Ayoub (2004) find
evidence of gaiatsu in the distribution of aid flows to Africa but results are mixed for Latin America
(Katada, 1997; Tuman et al., 2001) and negative for Asia (Tuman and Strand, 2006).  Looking
across regions, Tuman et al. (2005) do find evidence of gaiatsu.
The consensus in past work on multilateral organizations is that the geographic allocation
of multilateral aid reflects a greater emphasis on recipient need than does the geographic allocation
of bilateral aid (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  This does not mean that the
distribution of multilateral aid is determined purely by need.  Numerous studies of IFIs have
uncovered statistically significant links between donor geopolitical and commercial interests, on the
one hand, and access to IFI resources, on the other hand.   For the World Bank, a number of studies
find trade and commercial influences (Akins, 1981; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Frey and Schneider,
1986; Weck-Hannemann and Schneider, 1991) and a few uncover links to UN voting patterns
(Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen, 2006; Kilby, 2009A,B).
Research on ADB governance focuses primarily on Japanese and U.S. influence (Dutt, 1997,
2001; Kilby, 2006; Krasner, 1981; Wan, 1995; Wihtol, 1988; Yasutomo, 1983, 1995).  Japan has
significant sway for two key reasons:  its generous funding of the ADF and technical assistance
grants; and high ranking Japanese nationals in the Bank staffing (including the president).  The U.S.
maintains influence not by generous contributions but because of its unique global position as the5
dominant economic and military force.  The ADB charter gives the U.S. and Japan equal voting
weights and the organization's funding mechanisms allow the most recalcitrant member–typically
the U.S.–significant leverage (Wihtol, 1988).  Analysis of the ADB's formal governance structure
suggests that the institution serves both Japanese and U.S. interests (Dutt, 1997, 2001; Wihtol,
1988).
Relatively little quantitative work has been done on ADB aid allocation and donor interests.
Krasner (1981) and Wihtol (1988) employ basic descriptive statistics (means and correlations) to
examine lending patterns.  Looking at correlations between ADB lending and Japanese and U.S.
trade and aid flows (to proxy for commercial and geopolitical interests), Krasner finds uniformly
high correlations for Japan but low and variable correlations for the U.S.  He interprets these
differences as a reflection of the long-term geopolitical interests of the U.S., the global hegemon, as
compared to the narrower commercial interests of Japan.  Wihtol finds that ADB loans align closely
with Japanese bilateral aid while countries at odds with the U.S. (Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos at various points in time) received little or no ADB money.  There were no new loans to
Taiwan after it lost its seat in the UN to China in 1971.  Wihtol attributes the subsequent delay of
China's membership in the ADB until 1986 as “partly due to strong [U.S.] congressional opposition
to such a move” (Wihtol, 1988, 102).  India's restricted access to ADB resources reflects Japan’s
concern that India might come to dominate the ADB.  Based on this evidence, Wihtol concludes that
“the allocation of lending by country...[is] largely a reflection of the political and economic concerns
of the [Asian Development] Bank’s donors” (Wihtol, 1988, 173).
Kilby (2006) presents an econometric analysis of U.S. and Japanese influence on ADB
lending using panel data from 1968 to 2002.  The estimation method is a two part model consisting
of a selection equation (via probit) and a separate allocation equation in terms of budget shares (via6
FGLS).  Estimation results based on trade flows and voting alignment on all adopted UNGA regular
session resolutions suggest that donor interests play a larger role relative to humanitarian concerns
at the ADB than at the World Bank.
III. Framework
This section presents an empirical framework similar to that in Kilby (2009A, 2010) but
imposing stronger assumptions because of ADB data limitation.  I start with a general framework
for modeling the disbursement process and progressively revise this to describe the link between
disbursements and a collection of past and present commitments.  It is this revised form that provides
the starting point for the empirical analysis.
To understand the disbursement process, I examine the ADB's allocation of funds at the
project or program level.  Donors can influence ADB funding decisions in two distinct periods:  up
through loan approval and post-approval.  Up through loan approval, donors may expedite the early
phases of the project cycle or simply increase loan amounts as a reward to favored countries.
Alternatively, donors may hold up the process or slash loan amounts as a punishment for out-of-
favor countries.  During this period, these expediting or delaying tactics can work through formal
channels (via the speed of board approval) or informal channels (via pressure on ADB management
and staff charged with project preparation).  After loan approval, donors may pressure ADB
management or staff to accelerate disbursement, ignoring red flags indicating corruption, domestic
funding shortfalls, etc.  Conversely, donors could apply pressure in the opposite direction,
encouraging the ADB to slow or suspend disbursement.  In either event, this post-approval influence
is solely through informal channels since the board of directors has no direct oversight of
disbursements from already approved loans.Although the subscript i is redundant given that j indexes all projects (across all countries
1
and time periods), it is helpful for tracking other variables.
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I use the following notation to describe projects.  Let j index all ADB-funded projects (across
ij all recipient countries i and time periods t).  At loan approval, the ADB commits c  to country i for
project j.   While the loan is "active" (post-approval but before closing), the ADB disburses a
1
ijt it variable amount d  to country i for project j in year t.  Let A  be the set of active projects in recipient
it ijt it country i during year t.  If j ó A  (project j is not active in country i in year t), d  = 0; if j 0 A
ijt (project j is active in country i in year t), d  $ 0.
ijt Actual disbursements (d ) will differ from planned disbursements ( ) if project
implementation does not follow the plan spelled out in the Report and Recommendation to the
President (RRP) and the loan agreement.  In some cases, deviations from the original planned
disbursement profile may be the result of changing donor interests that lead to pressure on ADB staff
to modify disbursement.  Planned disbursements depend on the loan commitment amount,
characteristics of the project/program, and country characteristics.  One approach allowing for these
factors is to model the ratio of actual to planned disbursements as a function of these variables:
ijt it ijt = f(X ,DI ,g ) (1)
ijt where X  is a vector of project and country characteristics that influence the speed of disbursement,
it DI  is a vector of donor interest variables that may reflect donor pressure on the ADB regarding
ijt disbursements to country i, and g  is a stochastic element.  I define X such that higher values
correspond to project/country characteristics that speed disbursement and DI such that higher values
correspond to more intense positive donor interest (again, that may speed disbursement).  For the
ADB, DI will include both Japanese and U.S. interest variables.  One useful functional form is:
(2)This allows for loans that disburse over several years rather than assuming immediate
2
disbursement as in BulíÍ and Hamann (2003, 2007), Celasun and Walliser (2008), and Odedokun
(2003).
PLAID includes some project-level disbursement data but these are cumulative, not annual.
3
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where  .   Taking logs of both sides and rearranging yields
ijt 1 ijt 2 it ijt lnd  =   + $ X  + $ DI  + g (3)
The hypothesis that donors influence disbursement rates is equivalent to   while the alternative
hypothesis that donors do not influence disbursement rates implies .  Because   incorporates
2 the impact of any donor influence up to loan approval, $  captures only post-approval donor
influence (if any) which is purely informal.
Unfortunately, there are a number limitations in the available data that prevent direct
estimation of Equation (3).  The first limitation is that planned disbursements ( ) are not
ij systematically reported.  Fortunately, project level commitment data (c ) are available from the
ij ADB's Project Database or the PLAID data set.  Recall that c  is the amount committed by the ADB
to country i for project j in whatever year the project was approved (i.e., the original ADB loan
amount for project j).  Assuming a standard disbursement profile by project type and "age" (years
ij since the project was approved), c  is proportional to   once we control for project type (e.g., with
ijt a sector dummy variable) and age.   With these control variables included in X , the equation
2
becomes:
ijt ij 1 ijt 2 it ijt lnd  = lnc  + $ X  + $ DI  + g (4)
The second limitation is that data on actual disbursements are available only at the country
it ijt ijt level (d  = ), not at the project level (d ).   In addition, few project-level factors (X ) are
3
available.  I address these issues by shifting to country-level analysis, summing over all active
it projects in country i in year t (i.e., summing over  j 0 A ):More precisely, these are factors that: 1) may influence the disbursement rate; and, 2) are
4
consistent with the ADB's apolitical charter.
PLAID data on ADB projects also lack closing dates.
5
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 it  it 1 it 2 it it lnd  = lnc  + $ X  + $ DI  + g (5)
it I refer to the country-level commitment variable c  as Original Commitments to distinguish it from
new commitments approved by the ADB board in year t.  It is defined as the sum of ADB
commitments to country i for all projects still active in year t:
it c  = (6)
it Thus, c  reflects the portfolio of originally committed funds for active projects from which current
it disbursements could be drawn (the country's active loan portfolio).  X  is a vector of technical
country characteristics that may influence disbursement.   It also includes variables describing the
4
loan portfolio of country i in year t including Portfolio Age, the quantity-weighted "age" of the active
it loan portfolio.  Denoting this PA ,
(7)
ij(t-s) where c  are new ADB commitments to country i for project j in period t!s, i.e., loan amounts for
projects and programs approved in year t!s.  Note that the window of summation (the range of s)
excludes very old projects that are likely to be inactive even if not formally closed.  I use s+1 rather
than s as project age to give a non-zero weight to current commitments in the calculation of this
weighted average.
The third data limitation is that the ADB Projects Database lacks project completion dates.
5
The above definitions of Original Commitments and Portfolio Age require data on commitmentUsing military aid as a proxy for geopolitical importance would be reasonable for the U.S.
6
but not for Japan.  U.S. military aid proves insignificant if included in the specifications reported
below.
10
amounts, project approval dates, and project completion dates (when disbursement ends).  To work
around this limitation, I assume ADB disbursements extend over 8 years, the typical disbursement
period in the World Bank Projects Database.  The new measure of Original Commitments is
(8)
and the new measure of Portfolio Age is
(9)
ij(t!s) where c =0 if project j is not in country i.  Note that the old measures of Original Commitments
it and Portfolio Age exclude projects that have already closed (by requiring j 0 A ) while the new
measures do not.
The equation estimated for the ADB is
(10)
where   incorporates  .  To assess the impact of substituting in   and  , I estimate both (5)
and (10) using data for the World Bank.  World Bank data also include sector information not
available for the ADB; I assess this limitation in the same manner.
Donor Interest Variables
There are a number of possible donor interest variables.  Here, I explore three sets, the first
based on UN voting, the second based on bilateral aid, and the third based on trade.
6Although many votes are not close, a vote buying model is still relevant if the U.S. values
7
support regardless of the outcome.  For the UNSC, Dreher et al. (2009B) point out that the U.S.
works toward consensus by rewarding UNSC members for their votes even when those votes are not
required (for example, "No" votes where the U.S. could simply exercise its veto).
11
UN Voting
Following the work of Andersen, Harr, and Tarp (2006–henceforth AHT) on the IMF, I focus
on a measure of UN voting alignment derived from a vote buying model.  AHT differentiate between
important votes on which the donor lobbies other countries intensively and other votes on which the
donor does not.  Thus, only the second set of votes reflect the other countries' true preferences, free
of donor influence.  A country's alignment with the donor on these other votes reflects the country's
ideal location (relative to the donor) in the voting space.  Conversely, votes on important measures
reflect the outcome of donor influence, i.e., concessions the voting country makes to the donor
position. Payments to a country for its concessions to the donor should be related to the difference
between its alignment with the donor on important votes and its alignment with the donor on other
votes.  This is consistent with a vote buying model where alignment on other votes reflects the
voter's bliss point.  Kilby (2009B) evaluates these competing approaches empirically for the U.S.
using World Bank lending data and finds considerable support for a vote buying formulation.
7
One challenge with this approach in the context of the ADB is the available data.  Only the
U.S. government publishes a list of designated important UN votes.  Since 1983, Section 406 of
Public Law 101-246 has required the U.S. State Department to identify and report to Congress those
"votes on issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States
lobbied extensively."  (US PL 101-246 quoted in U.S. State Department, 2009, 123).  To the extent
that different votes are important for Japan or the five other G7 countries (henceforth G7-2), a
Japanese or G7-2 voting alignment variable based U.S.-designated important votes serves more as12
a control variable to verify that the U.S. variable captures just direct U.S. influence.  However, in
the case of Japan, the notation of gaiatsu (Japanese foreign policy as a reaction to external pressure
from the U.S.) suggests that using the same U.S. important votes may be reasonable.  Given the data
limitations, I proceed with this interpretation for the time being.
I define diffUSA as the difference between a country's alignment with the U.S. on important
UN votes and its alignment with the U.S. on other UN votes.  The variables diffJPN and diffG7-2
are defined in a parallel fashion, again using votes designated as important by the U.S.  I include
diffG7-2 to avoid omitted variable bias in the event that the G7-2 countries both influence ADB
lending and that their voting is correlated with U.S. or Japanese voting.
There are several possible objections to this UN voting measure in addition to the U.S.-
centric definition of important votes.  The underlying model is subject to the usual critiques of a
narrowly rational voting model.  It assumes away log rolling and other forms of strategic voting.
More critically, the model assumes that alignment on "other votes" is a good predictor of the voting
country's true preferences for the "important votes."  This presents two problems.  First, the U.S. is
not the only country which attempts to influence the outcome of UN voting; the  "other votes" could
be another donor's "important votes."  Even setting this concern aside, there is no assurance that
alignment on other votes is predictive of true preferences on important votes as the issues are likely
to be quite unrelated, i.e., the designation as "important" is non-random.  Although they do not
pursue this issue in detail, AHT point out that country fixed effects provide an alternative approach
to specifying the recipient government's bliss point.
If the vote buying model is correct, the optimal strategy for the vote buyer is to reward voting
countries based on how far they deviate from their bliss point toward the vote buyer's position.  In
the AHT formulation, this takes the form of an all-pay auction where countries "bid" on an increasedIt is also possible that there would be a non-political shift in the supply side of World Bank
8
funding if the country also adopts reforms more in-line with prevailing World Bank policy
prescriptions.
Indeed, it could decrease since alignment is bounded from above at unity.
9
13
probability of an IMF program.  AHT demonstrate that specifications excluding an appropriate bliss
point proxy will in general produce biased results.  However, one should also consider the impact
of omitting or mis-measuring the bliss point in the absence of vote buying.  Suppose a new
government comes to power with a more internationalist, pro-western orientation.  We would
simultaneously see a shift in UN voting toward the U.S. position and a demand-driven increase in
the flow of World Bank funds.   If the bliss point proxy (e.g., alignment on other votes) and
8
alignment on important votes do indeed span the same voting space, both will shift and the measure
of concessions to the U.S. would not increase.   However, if the bliss point is omitted (or measured
9
too poorly), omitted variable bias becomes a problem.  Although the U.S. exerts no pressure on the
Bank (in the scenario where vote buying does not happen), a voting shift toward the U.S. is
accompanied by an increase in Bank funding.
This possibility refocuses attention on how the bliss point is introduced.  It is unlikely that
the votes the U.S. considers important are, in the opinion of other voters, a random or representative
selection of all votes.  Thus, although voting alignment on "other votes" is a good proxy for the
voter's ideal location in the space of "other" issues ("other bliss point"), it is unlikely to be a good
proxy of the voter's ideal location in the space of "important" issues ("important bliss point").
Specifically, it is possible that the advent of a government with more internationalist, pro-western
orientation would cause a larger shift in the important bliss point than in the other bliss point,
resulting in a similar problem as when the bliss point proxy is omitted.
This example suggests that country fixed effects also may not be sufficient because they doIncluding a separate fixed effect for every government poses problems in terms of degrees
10
of freedom.  Also, exploratory regressions suggest only substantial changes matter: there is a
significant drop in funding levels the year before a substantial change in government while the effect
is much smaller and not significant if all changes in government are included.
Of course, Wittkopf did not have benefit of the State Department's post-1982 designations.
11
Indeed, it was an increased emphasis in U.S. Congress in early 1980s to identify what the public was
getting for its aid tax dollars that resulted in the law mandating State Department reporting.
14
not capture within-country changes.  But the example does point to an alternative–government fixed
effects.  Here, I include a separate fixed effect for each government that differs substantially from
its predecessor, i.e., when the government changes and the country's Polity score changes by more
than 3 points.
10
In a different context, Dreher and Strum (2010, Table 7) find similar results whether using
alignment on important votes, alignment on other votes, or the difference between the two.  This is
consistent with early work by Wittkopf (1973) critiquing prior  attempts to identify important UN
votes though recent analysis of U.S. bilateral aid does find strong evidence linking aid flows to
important votes in particular.   For ADB disbursements, the discussion above suggests similar
11
results for important vote alignment with fixed effects and the difference between important and
other vote alignment (with or without fixed effects) but very different results with other votes.  I
explore this question empirically below (Table 4).
Bilateral Aid
The second set of donor interest variables are bilateral aid flows.  The bilateral aid allocation
literature generally finds Japanese aid closely mirrors Japanese commercial interests (developing
sources for raw materials, cultivating export markets, and directly providing business for Japanese
firms) and that U.S. bilateral aid correlates with U.S. commercial and geopolitical interests.
Japanese and U.S. bilateral aid flows clearly are not perfect measures of donor interests in thisSee Fleck and Kilby (2006) for discussion of using like-minded donor aid as a control
12
variable.  I omit Canada from the like-minded donor group as it is already included in the G7-2.
Because exports and imports are highly correlated, it can be difficult to interpret the
13
coefficient on individual components of trade.
15
context, however, because they may have some humanitarian component.  To the extent that control
variables (i.e., population, GDP per capita, etc.) miss some aspect of need to which bilateral aid
flows respond, interpretation of the coefficients on these bilateral aid flows becomes difficult.  To
mitigate this concern, I also include bilateral aid from the so-called like-minded donors (Denmark,
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden).  These countries are known for their relatively humanitarian
aid practices.  The key advantage of using aid from these donors is that they have very limited power
within the ADB.   Thus, any link between like-minded aid flows and ADB lending should be driven
12
by common humanitarian elements and like-minded donor aid flows should be a better humanitarian
proxy than U.S., Japanese aid, or G7-2 aid.
Trade
The third set of donor interest variables is a group of measures based on trade flows.  For
ease of interpretation, I use total trade (imports plus exports) between each donor/recipient pair.
13
To make sure that U.S. or Japanese trade flows are not simply proxying for integration into the world
economy, I also include the country's overall world trade as well as G7-2 trade.
IV. Data
The data used in this analysis are described in Table 1.  Variables include aid flows and
related measures (from the ADB and various bilateral donors), recipient country economic and
political characteristics, UN voting alignments, and trade flows.  The data are an unbalanced panel;
the unit of observation is the recipient country/year.  The sample is determined largely by dataThe sample excludes eight influential observations (Afghanistan 1992; Solomon Islands
14
1995, 2001; Tuvalu 2003-5; Vanuatu 2003; Vietnam 1985).  Excluding these data points, results
are robust across specifications and sub-samples (e.g., omitting individual countries or years).   Due
to the relatively small number of borrowing member countries in the ADB and the extremes
represented (in terms of size, commercial importance, and geopolitical significance), the problem
of influential outliers and how to delineate the estimation sample is particular thorny in this analysis
(see the discussion on China below).  A list of included countries is included in Appendix B.
I use older IDS CD-ROM data to fill-in missing values in new data to recover countries
15
dropped from OECD coverage (especially from 2007 on).  IDS data are ahistorical in the sense that
the DAC alters historical data to fit current national boundaries.  When two countries unite, their
individual time series are combined so that current and historical data are available only in the
combined format.  When a country splinters, the DAC divides its data accordingly, again even back
through the period when the country was united.  When a country drops from DAC coverage (e.g.,
in 2007 when CEECs/NICs were dropped as no longer "developing"), the historical data for the
country vanishes.




availability.  Important UN voting data start in 1983 while DAC data on aid flows end with 2007.
Given the lag structure, the estimation sample is 540 observations on 33 ADB member countries for
the years 1984 to 2007.
14
Data come from a number of sources.  Disbursement variables (for the ADB, the U.S., Japan,
and the G7-2) are based on total official gross disbursements from the International Development
Statistics CD-ROM (OECD, 2006-2009).  I take ADB commitment data from the ADB Projects
15
Database (Asian Development Bank, 2010).  The OECD reports commitments only for official
development assistance (ODA) and the interest rate on ADB Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR)
loans is not concessional enough for these loans to qualify as ODA.   GDP and population data are
16
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009A) with missing values imputed using
Penn World Tables data (Heston et al., 2002, 2006).  Recipient country political/governance
indicators are derived from Freedom House indices (Freedom House, 2009), Polity IV scores (Polity
IV Project, 2009), and Cheibub et al. (2010).  Conflict data from PRIO cover through 2008I collected State Department data at the vote level rather than aggregated to the country
17
level so that measures can be constructed for Japan and the other G7 countries.
17
(Gleditsch et al., 2002).
Data on UN voting come from two sources.  Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009) provide data
on all UNGA regular session resolutions passed by roll call vote.  Data on UNGA votes designated
as important by the U.S. come from U.S. State Department (1984-2009).  These include some votes
not covered by Voeten and Merdzanovic–votes on defeated resolutions, votes on motions, votes on
paragraphs or language of proposed resolutions, emergency session votes, etc.
17
The UN voting alignment calculation is the same as in Kilby (2010) and closely follows
Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Jensen (2007).  For each vote, a country scores a 1 if it follows the
U.S., a 0.5 if it abstains or is absent when the U.S. votes (or vice versa), and a 0 if it opposes the U.S.
This process is repeated for Japan and each of the G7-2 countries.  A country's alignment is its mean
score for the year on either important or other votes (averaged again over the five countries in case
of the G7-2).  The analysis focuses on the difference between a country's alignment with the donor(s)
on important votes and other votes, designated as diffUSA, diffJPN, and diffG7-2.  See Appendix A
for precise definitions.
Turning to the numbers, ADB disbursements average $159 million with a maximum of $2
billion (Korea 1997).  Original Commitments average $1.5 billion with a maximum of $14.7 billion
(India 2007).  The portfolio-weighted age (Portfolio Age) averages 4 years, close to the middle of
the possible 1 to 8 range.  The dummy variable Blend equals 1 for countries that have access to both
concessional and nonconcessional ADB funds (OCR and ADF, i.e., Original Commitments greater
than zero in both categories), a situation that applies to 72 percent of the country/years in theBecause the ADB Projects Database does not indicate the source of funds (OCR versus
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ADF), I use PLAID data to construct this variable.  Also using PLAID data for Original
Commitments yields very similar results; the correlation between Original Commitments derived





The remaining variables describe country characteristics, including measures of U.S.,
Japanese, and G7-2 geopolitical interests in the country.  Population averages 120 million, ranging
from 9,516 people (Tuvalu 2001) to 1.3 billion (China 2007).  GDP per capita (PPP) averages
$3,178 in 2000 dollars, running from $312 (Myanmar 1988) to $15,011 (Korea 1999).  Freedom
House is the average of the civil liberties and political rights indices, inverted so that 1 indicates least
free and 7 indicates most free with an mean of 3.8.  Forty-five percent of the observations in the
sample are for democracies according to the Cheibub et al. (2010) Democracy indicator.  The
variable War is a dummy indicating whether the country is involved in a major conflict with at least
1000 war-related deaths in that year, the case in eight percent of the sample.
The UN variables are lagged one year since UN votes happen predominantly in the last
quarter of the calendar year.  The average alignment with the U.S. on important votes is 0.4264, with
countries ranging all the way from always disagreeing with the U.S. (Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam
in various years) to alignment of 0.9 (Fiji 1984).  Average alignment with Japan and the other G7
countries on these votes is notably higher at 0.6651 and 0.6487.  Surprisingly, this difference is even
more pronounced for other votes where the averages for the U.S., Japan and the other G7 countries
are 0.3053, 0.7354, and 0.6559.  Conversely, it is no surprise that the variances of the important vote
variables is substantially higher than those of the other vote variables since the latter are based on
a substantially larger number of individual votes.  The "diff" variables are the difference between
important vote alignment and other vote alignment.  The average for diffUSA is 0.12, with theG7-2 aid and Like-minded donor aid are averages over their groups.  When these variables
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are converted to logs, I include the average of the log (where defined) rather than the log of the
average.  Results are generally not sensitive to how this step is done.  The same applies to trade
variables below.  This approach makes more sense when including the common agency measures
later in the paper.
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variable ranging from !0.364 (Afghanistan 2001) to 0.6466 (Fiji 1984).  The average score for Japan
is actually negative at !0.07 and ranges from !0.5912 (Laos 1983) to 0.3446 (Fiji 1984).  The
average the five other G7 countries as a group, diffG7-2, is close to zero with a minimum of !0.4121
(Laos 1987) and a maximum of 0.3414 (Fiji 1985).
I measure bilateral aid via gross disbursements (to match the dependent variable) and lag all
variables one year to minimize endogeneity concerns, for example, if bilateral donors follow the lead
of the ADB.  The average annual amount for US aid is $65 million.  The highest level of US aid is
$1.1 billion (Pakistan 2003).  The average annual amount for Japanese aid is $416 million, reflecting
the heavy regional concentration of Japanese foreign assistance.  The highest level of Japanese aid
is $5.1 billion (Thailand 1999).  The average annual amount for G7-2 aid is $29 million; this is an
average over the five donors, not the sum of their disbursements.  The peak value is $254 million
(China 1996).  The average annual amount for Like-minded donor aid is $11 million (again, group
average not sum) with the highest level at $104 million (India 1987).
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Finally, Table 1 reports statistics for four trade variables.  US trade is the sum of the country's
imports from and exports to the U.S.; the other variables are defined in a parallel fashion except that
G7-2 trade is averaged over the five countries in the group.  World trade includes trade with the G7
so that, once it is included in an estimation, we can interpret the coefficients on the other trade
measures as capturing any unique aspects of trading with those partners, rather than just the general
impact of trade or its covariates.  As with bilateral aid, trade variables are lagged by one year to
reduce concerns of reverse causation (though the relative magnitudes of aid and trade make this aOne might think of trade flows scaled by donor GDP to capture the importance of a trading
20
partner.  Given the log specification used below, this scaling factor just folds into the year dummies
included in all specification.  An alternative approach is to examine aid shares as in Kilby (2006).
See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a discussion of these different approaches.
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minor concern in practical terms).
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Turning to the numbers, US trade averages $7.9 billion, reaching a high of $360 billion
(China 2007).  Japanese trade averages $6.6 billion, topping out at $211 billion (China 2006).  G7-2
trade averages $1.1 billion with a maximum of $45 billion (China 2006).  World trade averages
$46.6 billion, peaking at $1.9 trillion (China 2006).
V.  Estimation and Results
The estimates presented below are from an allocation equation conditional on selection.  That
is, the equation describes disbursements of ADB funds in cases where disbursements are positive
rather than zero.  Results should be interpreted as such, i.e., not generalized to the unconditional case
without noting the strong assumptions necessary to do so.  Alternative approaches include estimating
a Type I tobit, Type II tobit (Heckman selection model), or 2 part model (independent selection and
allocation equations).
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Given the distribution of disbursements with some extremely high, possibly anomalous
values, a log specification is critical for finding generalizable, broadly meaningful results.  Since zero
disbursements can and do happen, this presents the standard "log of zero" problem.  Using a Type
I tobit (the standard tobit method) imposes the strong assumption that the same factors have the same
weight in both the selection decision (whether or not to disburse any funds to a given country) and
the conditional allocation decision (how much to disburse if the country is selected).  In the case of
aid flows, this seems a particularly poor assumption since a factor like population might play a veryI rely on two types of nonlinearities, those arising from the probit function and using
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dichotomous versions of bilateral aid variables in the selection equation but continuous versions of
these same variables in the allocation equation.  In addition, I had to progressively strip out variables
(e.g., year dummies) to achieve convergence.
It is a possible to estimate a selection equation without year dummies (e.g., with a trend
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term) but this severely limits comparisons with the allocation equation and hence interpretation of
results.  The underlying source of this estimation problem is limited variability in the ADB sample.
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different role at the selection and allocation stages; Kilby (2006) illustrates this point for ADB
disbursements.  The tobit specification also places sharp limits on the types of panel methods that
yield consistent estimates (e.g., no recipient country fixed effects).  The Type II tobit is less
restrictive but presents identification problems given the lack of theory-based exclusion restrictions.
Panel methods are again limited and convergence problems common.  With these caveats in mind,
I estimate a relatively simple Type II tobit model using regional dummies rather than country fixed
effects and achieving identification via nonlinearities.   Tests based on this specification fail to
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reject the hypothesis that the error terms of the selection and allocation equations are uncorrelated.
Taken together, these considerations point toward estimating a two part model, that is a selection
equation and, separately, an allocation equation.
However, a confluence of factors undermines the usefulness of estimating a selection
equation.  The critical step in the analysis below is including Original Commitments to control for
the impact of formal influence.  In the selection equation, one might include this as a dichotomous
variable (Original Commitments>0) or as a continuous variable (e.g., log of Original Commitments).
However, Original Commitments=0 perfectly predicts ADB disbursements=0 since there can be no
disbursements when there are no funds to disburse.  This leaves the continuous variable as the only
option.  Unfortunately, in this specification collinearity causes a number of year dummies to drop
from the estimation.  The result is that we cannot estimate a satisfactory selection equation.
23As noted above, I only generate a new government fixed effect if the new government
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differs substantially ()polity>±3).  In the estimation sample with 33 countries, there are 49
separately identified governments.  Results are generally similar with country fixed effects.
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All specifications include year dummies and government fixed effects.   Reported t statistics
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are based on robust standard errors.  The dependent variable is the natural log of ADB
disbursements.  Several explanatory variables are also logged.  This includes Population and GDP
per capita as well as the aid and trade variables.  Dichotomous, index, and time variables are not
logged.  Table 2 reports results for specifications that include different donor interest variables but
which omit Original Commitments and related portfolio variables.  Table 3 includes these variables.
Table 4 assesses alternative UN voting measures.  Table 5 presents estimates using World Bank data
for comparison with Tables 2 and 3.  Table 6 assesses the impact of ADB data limitations by also
imposing them on World Bank data.  Tables 7 and 8 explore the impact of donor heterogeneity.
Specifications including commitment variables generally account for 70 to 75 percent of the
variation in the dependent variable.
Formal and Informal Influence
Table 2 presents four allocation equation specifications that exclude Original Commitments
and related portfolio variables.  Without this set of control variables, the estimated coefficients
reflect the impact of the explanatory variables on both commitment levels (up to the approval stage)
and subsequent disbursement rate of those commitments (at the post-approval stage).  For the donor
interest variables, these estimates reflect the combination of formal and informal influence.
Many of the country characteristics included as control variables are insignificant.  For
Population (and to a lesser extent GDP per capita), this is due to the inclusion of fixed effects.  For
example, in a simple log-log bivariate regression (without fixed effects), Population explains 6023
percent of the variation in ADB disbursements.  Without fixed effects, Freedom House and
Democracy are significant (positive) in this sample when included individually.  The War dummy
variable enters consistently with the expected negative sign (fewer disbursements in war-torn
countries) but is generally not statistically significant.  The signs on GDP per capita, Freedom House
and Democracy appear counter-intuitive but exclude selection effects.  In a selection equation, GDP
per capita enters with a negative sign (consistent with need-based selection) and Freedom House
and Democracy enter with positive signs.
Column (1) of Table 2 includes the first set of donor interest variables measuring concessions
made to donors when casting important UN votes.  Recall that important votes are designated as such
only by the U.S. so that this variable is the correct measure for the U.S., a reasonable measure for
Japan if  gaiatsu is an important determinant of Japanese foreign policy, and simply an appropriate
control variable in the case of the G7-2.  In this specification, the estimated coefficient for diffUSA
is positive and significant while the estimated coefficient for diffJPN is smaller and not statistically
significant.
The magnitude of the U.S. effect is substantial.  For a typical country (i.e., holding all values
at the sample mean), the predicted disbursement is $34 million.  Holding all else constant but
increasing diffUSA by one standard deviation (0.1603), the predicted disbursement rises to $48
million, a 40% increase.  The largest one period change in diffUSA was a jump in the score for Laos
from !0.1875 (1989) to 0.2820 (1990); using these two values and an otherwise typical country,
predicted disbursement rises from $18 million to $48 million, a 160 % increase.  We can also
estimate the value of a vote.  Switching from voting against the U.S. to voting with the U.S. raises
diffUSA by approximately 0.2.  For a typical country (i.e., all variables set to their sample means),
this corresponds to a $17 million greater predicted disbursement.  Thus, a typical UN vote is worthA one standard deviation increase in the average of the log of G7-2 aid corresponds to a $20
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million increase in the level of average G7-2 aid, i.e., $100 million increase counting all five donors.
If Vietnam is dropped from the sample, U.S. bilateral aid becomes marginally significant.
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$17 million in ADB funding–either due to higher commitments, faster disbursement of existing
commitments, or some combination of the two.
Column (2) of Table 2 uses bilateral aid flows to capture donor interests.  I include aid flows
from the like-minded donors to capture any humanitarian factors not already included; the variable
Liked-minded donor aid enters with a negative though insignificant coefficient estimate.  In this
specification, only aid from the other G7 countries proves significant.  The point estimate indicates
that one percent higher G7-2 bilateral aid disbursement corresponds to 0.265 percent higher ADB
disbursement.  To put this in perspective, if the log of G7-2 bilateral aid for a typical recipient
country (i.e., all independent variables set to their sample mean values) is one standard deviation
higher, predicted ADB disbursements are $34 million (100 percent) higher.
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Column (3) introduces trade flows to reflect donor commercial interests.  While all trade
measures have positive coefficient estimates, none are significantly different from zero (individually
or jointly).  Column (4) includes all three groups of donor interest variables simultaneously.  The
estimation results change very little.  Overall, this table provides strong evidence of American
influence over ADB lending when we consider formal and informal influence together.
Informal Influence Only
Table 3 adds Original Commitments and related portfolio variables the Table 2
specifications.  These variables control for donor influence up through loan approval (the period
which includes avenues of formal influence) and thus effectively capture the influence of events up
through board approval on disbursement.  Since the board has no official role in post-approvalThis assumes formal donor influence does not substantial bias the mix of projects toward
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those with faster disbursement profiles.
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disbursement decisions, any remaining effects captured by donor interest variables in this setting
reflect informal influence only.
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The commitment variables enter as expected with quantitatively substantial and statistically
significant coefficients.  The estimated coefficient on Original Commitments ranges between 0.636
and 0.688, indicating that a one percentage point increase in the size of the portfolio available for
disbursement increases disbursements by about 0.65 percent.  The assumption of a coefficient equal
to one on Original Commitments in Equation (10) is soundly rejected in all specifications; this may
be due to the approximation and is explored in more detail below.  Portfolio age enters with a
positive linear term and a negative quadratic term, indicating peak disbursement four years after
project approval.
There are a number of differences in the role of the control variables.  While the level of
disbursements to countries when they have blend status (access to both concessional and non-
concessional ADB money) is not significantly different than when they do not have blend status
(Table 2), the rate of disbursement is significantly lower (Table 3).  This is consistent with the
pattern of commitments in the data: when countries have blend status they have significantly larger
active loan portfolios (higher Original Commitments) than when they do not have blend status.  The
larger portfolio disburses more slowly leading to a comparable level of disbursements.  The positive
coefficient estimate for population indicates a disbursement rate that is higher than the country's
norm when the country's population is higher than its norm though the significance of this effect
depends substantially on one country (Western Samoa).
Turning to the donor interest variables, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients areFor example, using a different sample and a specification that does not include fixed effects,
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Kilby (2006) does find evidence of Japanese  influence in ADB disbursements.
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generally smaller, consistent with the interpretation that the table reflects only informal influence.
The U.S. UN voting variable diffUSA enters with a smaller though still significant coefficient in both
columns (1) and (4); the estimated coefficient for diffJPN is negative and marginally significant.  The
analysis in Table 4 sheds some light on this result.  Note also that the estimated coefficient for G7-2
aid is now small, statistically insignificant, and negative.
Looking at the results from Tables 2 and 3 together tells us something about the avenues
through which donors influence the ADB.  The estimates suggest that U.S. influence in the ADB
does not end with project approval but continues during the post-approval implementation phase.
Judging by the size of the estimated coefficients, this post-approval, and hence informal, channel is
as important as U.S. influence up to loan approval.  In contrast, the combined influence of the G7-2
(Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy) appears to operate only pre-approval.
The "no influence" result for Japan is surprising considering the country's role in the ADB
and the results of past research.  Is it possible that the above analysis misses something important
regarding Japanese influence?  One possibility is the fixed effect analysis.   If Japan's interests are
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very persistent, there may be insufficient time series variation to identify the effects of Japanese
influence.  To investigate this possibility, I re-estimate the equations in Tables 2 and 3 excluding
fixed effects.  Even in this setting, Japanese interest variables remain insignificant in all
specifications though the estimated coefficient on U.S. bilateral aid does become significant.  A
second possibility is the use of U.S.-important UN votes.  Although there is no perfect solution to
this problem since other countries do not publish lists of their "important" votes, I re-estimate the
previous equations using other UN alignment measures.  Results for the UN variables areI identified China as an outlier through a robustness check that sequentially omits entire
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countries or entire years from the estimation sample.  Only the regression omitting China yields a
significant coefficient on Japan other votes.  Two factors contribute to this.  First, disbursements to
China tend to be large, making Chinese observations potentially influential.  Second, China's size
and important role in geopolitics (e.g., the only ADB regional member with a permanent seat on the
UNSC) makes the notion of buy its UN vote with ADB funding far less plausible.
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summarized in Table 4.
The first three columns of Table 4A report estimation results for a specification that excludes
commitment portfolio variables (formal and informal influence).  Column (1) measures UN
alignment with the "other votes" variable, i.e., using UNGA regular session votes that the U.S. State
Department did not designate at important.  Because there are relatively few important votes, these
results are essentially the same as with all regular session votes.  With this UN voting measure, the
estimated coefficient for Japanese alignment is now positive but not statistically significant.  The
relatively large coefficient estimate (4.133) reflects the high degree of correlation between Japanese
voting alignment and G7-2 voting alignment (0.89);  the coefficient falls to 2 if the G7-2 variable
is omitted.  With China excluded from the estimation sample, the estimated coefficient for Japan
other votes increases in size (6.247, 3.2 when G7-2 other votes is omitted) and significance.   In
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these specifications, the estimated coefficient for US other votes small and insignificant.
Of course, these measures are based on precisely the "wrong" votes from the U.S.
perspective.  Column (3) rectifies this by including both important votes and other votes for each
group.  Now US important votes also enters with a positive, significant coefficient.  For Japan, the
positive coefficient on Japan other votes and negative coefficient on Japan important votes explain
the previous negative sign for diffJPN.  Columns (4) to (6) repeat this exercise for the specification
that includes commitment portfolio variables, confirming that a similar pattern holds when
restricting attention to post-approval informal influence.28
When comparing the magnitudes of estimated coefficients on the important votes and other
votes variables it is important to remember the differences between these measures.  First, the
domestic cost of switching a vote may differ between the two groups of votes.  Second, the sample
variance is quite different between the two since  important vote alignment is typically based on 10
individual votes while other vote alignment is typically based on 100 individual votes.  It is difficult
to address the first issue but the second is readily dealt with via the standardized coefficients reported
in Table 4B.  Using the estimated equation in column (3) for both formal and informal influence,
increasing Japan other votes one standard deviation above the sample mean for an otherwise typical
country raises predicted ADB disbursements from $32 million to $49 million, an increase of $17
million or 55%.  Increasing US important votes one standard deviation above the sample mean for
an otherwise typical country raises predicted ADB disbursements from $32 million to $55 million,
an increase of $23 million or 75%.  Using the estimated equation in column (6) for informal, post-
approval influence only, increasing Japan other votes one standard deviation above the sample mean
for an otherwise typical country raises predicted ADB disbursements from $32 million to $53
million, an increase of $21 million or 70%.  Increasing US important votes one standard deviation
above the sample mean for an otherwise typical country raises predicted ADB disbursements from
$32 million to $42 million, an increase of $10 million or 30%.
Thus, setting aside the special case of China, we find evidence of both Japanese and U.S.
influence in the allocation of ADB funds.  When measuring impact via standard deviations, it
appears that the magnitude of Japanese and U.S. influence are similar, with U.S. influence more
pronounced when formal influence is included and Japanese influence more pronounced when




The approach taken above is similar to that used in Kilby (2010) to examine informal
influence in the World Bank.  The results here for the U.S. are similar to those for the World Bank
where post-approval, informal influence appeared to be at least as important as influence earlier on.
However, data limitations for the ADB required a modified version of the Original Commitments
and Portfolio age variables.  Table 3 estimates Equation (10) rather than Equation (5) while results
reported in Kilby (2010) for the World Bank are based on an equation similar to (5).  This leaves
open the question:  To what degree is are the results effected by measurement error in Equation (10)?
To assess the impact of the two different versions of Original Commitments and Portfolio
age, I present results for the World Bank in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 reports specifications parallel
to those in Table 2 (in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5) and Table 3 (in Columns (4) to (6) of Table
5) but using the full information on project duration (and sector) available in the World Bank
Projects Database.  Table 6 then imposes ADB-style data restrictions on World Bank data to assess
the impact of these data limitations.
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Column (1) of Table 5 looks at overall formal and informal U.S. influence using the full
World Bank sample.  The U.S. UN voting alignment variable enters with a positive and significant
coefficient in this specification; alignment for the other G7 countries (this time including Japan) is
also positive and significant.  Both the estimated coefficients for U.S. aid and other G7 aid are also
positive and significant.  Restricting the sample to ADB member countries in Column (2) reduces
the number of observations considerably.  The estimated coefficient for U.S. UN alignment is larger
in the ADB sub-sample while the estimated coefficient for other G7 UN alignment shrinks and is
no longer significant.  The estimated coefficient on U.S. aid becomes small and not significant while30
the estimated coefficient for other G7 aid is essentially the same in the ADB sub-sample.  In
addition, the estimated coefficient for other G7 trade doubles and is statistically significant for this
group of countries.  Column (3) presents results for a bootstrapped estimation using random samples
the same size as in Column (2).  The smaller t-statistics in this column (relative to Column (2))
indicate that, if anything, donor influence is more consistent within the ADB sub-sample than
outside it.
Columns (4) to (6) repeat this exercise but with the full specification that includes the range
of portfolio variables available in the World Bank Projects Database, including the correctly defined
Original Commitments.  The estimated coefficient on diffUSA is smaller but still statistically
significant in the full sample.  Looking only at ADB member countries in Column (5), the pattern
of change for U.S. variables is similar to that in Column (2):  the estimated coefficient diffUSA
increases in magnitude (and is marginally significant) while the aid coefficient becomes much
smaller and statistically insignificant.  Column (6) confirms that a stronger U.S. UN voting link in
the ADB sub-sample than in a random sub-sample.
Table 6 re-estimates the final three columns of Table 5 after imposing ADB-style data
limitations.  Two important patterns emerge.  First, comparing donor interest variables in Column
(2) of Table 6 with those in Column (5) of Table 5, the data restrictions do not appear to dramatically
influence the estimated coefficients in the ADB-only sample except for G7-1 aid (which increases
marginally in size and significance).  Although only indirect evidence, this suggests that the ADB
data limitations do not drive the results found earlier.  Second, the coefficient estimates on Original
Commitments are substantially smaller than when the variable is correctly defined (attenuation bias).
In particular, both Equations (5) and (10) imply a coefficient of unity on Original Commitments.
When the Original Commitments variable is correctly defined (Table 5), we consistently fail to rejectCopelovitch's measure variation with the coefficient of variation (COV – standard deviation
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divided by the mean after the data have been shifted right so that all values are positive).  I use the
standard deviation (STD) as my results were sensitive to the size of the rightward shift needed for
the COV calculation.
31
the hypothesis that the true coefficient equals 1.  However, with the approximation used in Table 6
(and, equally, in Table 3), we consistent can reject the hypothesis that the true coefficient equals 1.
Taken together, these two patterns suggest data limitations have real effects but there is no evidence
these constraints drive the findings reported earlier.
Preference Heterogeneity and the Common Agency model
A final issue I explore is the impact of preference heterogeneity between donor countries in
a common agency framework.  Copelovitch (2010) argues for the importance of considering
preference heterogeneity to understand how donor interests impact IFI behavior.  As he puts it,
"principal–agent theory suggests that agent autonomy in cases of common agency is a function of
both the intensity and heterogeneity of principals' preferences."  (Copelovitch, 2010, 57)  When
preferences are intense and homogeneous, the outcome is likely to reflect the principals' preferences.
When preferences are intense but heterogeneous, the outcome can be either a stalemate or a log roll.
Copelovitch operationalizes this in his study of the IMF by measuring preference intensity via the
group average and heterogeneity via a measure of variation among group members.  He also includes
the interaction of the two to investigate the conditional hypothesis.   I repeat that analysis here for
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the ADB using G7 UN voting alignment, G7 aid, and G7 trade.  Results for the variables of interest
are reported in Table 7.  For UN voting, I use the AHT formulation but results are the same wuing
other measure.  Because of the interaction terms, conditional marginal effects are depicted in Figures
1 and 2.32
The graphs in Figures 1 and 2 plot the marginal effect of one variable on the outcome (ADB
disbursements) as a function of the conditioning variable.  The graphs also include the 95%
confidence interval (dashed lines) and the distribution of the conditioning variable (histogram but
with scale omitted).  Figure 1 and Column (1) of Table 7 exclude commitments while Figure 2 and
Column (2) include commitments.  The first panel of Figure 1 examines the marginal effect of diffG7
(G7 preference intensity) conditional on STD diffG7 (G7 preference heterogeneity).  The graph
illustrates that all levels of preference heterogeneity, the marginal effect of an increase in diffG7 is
not significantly different from zero.  The right hand side panel depicts a similar pattern for marginal
effect of heterogeneity (STD diffG7) conditioning on diffG7.
The middle left hand side panel illustrates the one significant relationship in the graphs.  The
marginal effect of G7 aid is positive and fairly constant.  The estimated effect is significant if STD
G7 aid is greater than 1.2, which is true for most of the sample.  Thus, in practice, the impact of
preference intensity does not depend greatly on preference heterogeneity or vice versa.  Neither
estimation uncovers the sort of strong relationship evident in Copelovitch's work with the IMF.
While Copelovitch's conditional marginal effects plots show a significant relationship between
preference heterogeneity and IMF lending when donor preferences are intense, no such pattern
emerges in the case of the ADB.
It is possible that we have defined the principals too broadly in the case of the ADB, that we
should restrict attention to preference heterogeneity between Japan and the U.S.  Table 8 explores
this issue with a set of simple interaction terms.  For each of the three Japanese interest measures
(UN voting concessions, bilateral aid, and bilateral trade), I define a "low" binary variable which
equals 1 if the Japanese interest measure is one of the lowest 50 observations and a "high" binary
variable which equals 1 if the Japanese interest measure is one of the highest 50 observations.  I33
interact these binary variables with the corresponding continuous U.S. interest measure to allow the
impact to vary with preference heterogeneity.  Because the interaction terms involve a binary
variable, we can interpret the marginal effects directly from the table without the aid of conditional
marginal effects graphs.
Column (1) of Table 8 presents results for the variables of interest looking at the combined
impact of formal and informal influence (i.e., omitting commitment portfolio variables).  Looking
first at UN voting, both interaction terms are small and neither is statistically significant.  Thus, the
impact of alignment with the U.S. is essentially unrelated to the degree of alignment with Japan.  The
estimation sample again excludes China and the specification uses the UN variables most appropriate
to capture each donor's geopolitical interests ("important" votes for the U.S., "other" votes for Japan).
Parallel estimations using other UN variables (e.g., diffUSA, etc.) yield similar results for the
interaction terms.  Turning to bilateral aid measures, the estimated coefficient on the high Japanese
aid interaction term is positive and marginally significant, indicating that the impact of the US aid
variable does depend on the level of Japanese aid.  However, the combined effect is still not
significantly different from zero; the hypothesis that the basic coefficient and the interaction term
coefficient sum to zero cannot be rejected (p=0.1506).  For trade, the high Japanese trade interaction
term is significance (only when China is excluded) but again the combined effect is not statistically
different from zero (p=.3609).  Column (2) of Table 8 presents the same analysis including
commitment portfolio variables to focus on post-approval, informal influence only.  Results are
essentially the same regarding interaction terms.  Comparing the columns, we again see evident that
Japanese influence in particular has a substantial informal component.  Altogether, preference
heterogeneity appears to play a limited role in how ADB behavior correlates with donor interests.34
VI. Conclusion
Meaningful, efficiency-promoting reform of international financial institutions hinges on a
full understanding of how these institutions currently function.  The core component of recent reform
efforts is a drive to redistribute votes.  Such changes in the governance structure of IFIs may reduce
the formal influence of historically powerful nations such as Japan and the U.S.  Less reform
attention–and less research attention–has focused on avenues of informal influence.  Indeed, the
relative importance of formal and informal influence is not well understood.  With such gaps in our
knowledge, it is impossible to say how effective governance reform is likely to be at changing the
actual functioning of an institution.
This paper picks apart the avenues through which donors influence the Asian Development
Bank.  I find quantitatively and statistically significant links between both Japanese and U.S.
interests–and, to a lessor degree, other G7 countries–and ADB disbursements to eligible countries
when allowing for a broad spectrum of donor influence (over loan commitment amounts and loan
disbursement rates).  This broad-spectrum approach captures both formal and informal channels of
influence.  Narrowing the focus to post-approval informal influence does not appear to reduce
Japan's influence but does shrink U.S. and eliminate other G7 countries' influence.  This suggests
that much of U.S. and, especially, Japanese influence is via informal channels.  In this panel analysis,
the donor interest variables that matter are based on UN voting patterns, thus reflecting geopolitical
concerns.  Interestingly, Japanese influence is only apparent when China is omitted from the sample;
the same is not true for the U.S..  This suggests that Japanese policy toward China within the ADB
is different than its policy toward other nations.  Overall, the analysis indicates that governance
reforms redistributing formal voting power to rising regional powers (such as China and India) are
unlikely eliminate U.S. and, especially, Japanese dominance in the ADB, at least in the short run.35
These finding are intriguing in what they say about the exercise of informal influence more
broadly.  In the case of the World Bank, the institution's physical proximity to the U.S. government
and the multitude of links between World Bank staff and U.S. government employees are obvious
factors in facilitating the exercise of U.S. informal influence.  Such close geographic proximity to
the dominant donors is absent in the case of the ADB.  That donor influence is nonetheless
substantially informal suggests other features may be as important as proximity for the exercise of
informal influence.36
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Number of observations = 539
Variable Mean StDev Min Max Description
ADB disbursements 158.6 265.5 0.15 2,000 ADB disbursements (in millions)
Original Commitments 1,543 2,397 0.125 14,666 Sum of commitments for active projects (in millions)
Portfolio age 4.168 1.201 1 8 Portfolio weighted age
Blend 0.718 0.4504 0 1 OCR & ADF Original Commitments
Population 119.4 290.8 0.009516 1,318 Population in millions
GDP per capita 3,178 2,248 312 15,011 PPP GDP per capita in chained 2000 $
Freedom House 3.778 1.678 1 7 Averaged Freedom House Rating (inverted)
Democracy 0.4508 0.498 0 1 Democracy indicator
War 0.08349 0.2769 0 1 Dummy indicating on-going major conflict (>1000 dead)
US important votes 0.4264 0.1801 0 0.9 Alignment with US on UN votes important to US (t-1)
Japan important votes 0.6651 0.1454 0.15 1 Alignment with Japan on UN votes important to US (t-1)
G7-2 important votes 0.6487 0.1441 0.15 0.94 Alignment with other G7 on UN votes important to US (t-1)
US other votes 0.3053 0.1065 0.119 0.6827 Alignment with US on other UN votes (t-1)
Japan other votes 0.7354 0.06062 0.5703 0.9219 Alignment with Japan on other UN votes (t-1)
G7-2 other votes 0.6559 0.05903 0.5155 0.8588 Alignment with other G7 on other UN votes (t-1)
diffUSA 0.1211 0.1603 -0.364 0.6466 Concessions to US on UN votes important to US
diffJPN -0.07031 0.1379 -0.4812 0.3446 Concessions to Japan on UN votes important to US
diffG7-2 -0.007185 0.1352 -0.4121 0.3414 Concessions to other G7 on UN votes important to US
US aid 65.4 121.3 0 1,117 Disbursements of US economic aid (t-1)
Japanese aid 416 759.2 0.1 5,062 Disbursements of Japanese economic aid (t-1)
G7-2 aid 29.16 46.79 0 254 Average disbursements of other G7 economic aid (t-1)
Like-minded donor aid 10.7 16.32 0 103.9 Average disbursements of Like-minded donor aid (t-1)
US trade 7,895 28,119 0 361,012 US trade (imports+exports) with country in millions (t-1)
Japanese trade 6,630 19,095 0 211,233 Japanese trade (imports+exports) with country in millions (t-1)
G7-2 trade 1,098 3,443 0.1266 44,633 Average of G7-2 (IM+EX) with country in millions (t-1)
World trade 46,672 149,303 1.569 1,920,585 World trade (imports+exports) with country in millions (t-1)42
Table 2: Formal and Informal Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
Blend 0.0986 0.101 0.0860 0.0249
(0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.08)
Population -0.124 -0.0246 -0.109 -0.690
(-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.27)
GDP per capita 2.072** 1.708** 1.511 1.259
(2.81) (2.27) (1.56) (1.41)
Freedom House -0.147 -0.127 -0.188* -0.184*
(-1.47) (-1.32) (-1.94) (-1.89)
Democracy -0.200 -0.214 -0.177 -0.130
(-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.55) (-0.42)
War -0.200 -0.199 -0.163 -0.226







US aid (t-1) 0.0178 0.0204
(0.40) (0.43)
Japanese aid (t-1) 0.0364 -0.0134
(0.31) (-0.12)
G7-2 aid (t-1) 0.265** 0.253**
(2.36) (2.15)
Like-minded donor aid (t-1) -0.0589 -0.0661
(-0.59) (-0.67)
US trade (t-1) 0.0111 0.0312
(0.17) (0.52)
Japanese trade (t-1) 0.0122 0.0715
(0.33) (1.49)
G7-2 trade (t-1) 0.230 0.0862
(1.26) (0.57)
World trade (t-1) 0.145 0.00181
(0.61) (0.01)
N 539 539 539 539
All specifications include year dummies and government fixed effects.
t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0543
Table 3: Informal Influence Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
Original Commitments 0.656** 0.671** 0.636** 0.688**
(5.78) (6.40) (5.86) (6.06)
Portfolio age 0.466 0.552 0.497 0.581*
(1.32) (1.59) (1.41) (1.70)
Portfolio age -0.0636 -0.0741* -0.0663* -0.0769**
2
(-1.66) (-1.98) (-1.74) (-2.10)
Blend -0.402** -0.350* -0.353* -0.400**
(-2.04) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-2.12)
Population 2.183** 2.405** 2.034* 2.707**
(2.08) (2.08) (1.78) (2.03)
GDP per capita 0.971** 1.246** 1.065** 1.017**
(2.86) (3.72) (2.62) (2.69)
Freedom House -0.0711 -0.0804 -0.0671 -0.0646
(-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.78) (-0.78)
Democracy -0.238 -0.234 -0.214 -0.242
(-1.13) (-0.97) (-0.88) (-1.03)
War -0.119 -0.114 -0.125 -0.106







US aid (t-1) 0.0320 0.0387
(1.21) (1.43)
Japanese aid (t-1) -0.0933 -0.103
(-1.12) (-1.23)
G7-2 aid (t-1) -0.0489 -0.0750
(-0.80) (-1.28)
Like-minded donor aid (t-1) -0.0916* -0.104*
(-1.73) (-2.00)
US trade (t-1) -0.0292 -0.0275
(-0.59) (-0.59)
Japanese trade (t-1) -0.0125 -0.0229
(-0.50) (-0.89)
G7-2 trade (t-1) 0.103 0.187
(0.83) (1.39)
World trade (t-1) -0.0627 -0.0622
(-0.36) (-0.35)
N 539 539 539 539
All specifications include year dummies and government fixed effects.
t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0544
Table 4A: Alternative UN alignment measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
US:
     important votes 3.057** 1.556*
(2.99) (1.76)
     other votes 0.157 0.832 0.0330 0.205 0.666 0.507
(0.17) (1.17) (0.04) (0.27) (1.00) (0.64)
Japan:
     important votes 0.282 -0.883
(0.12) (-0.54)
     other votes 4.133 6.247** 6.994** 6.003* 7.420** 8.443**
(1.29) (2.45) (2.65) (1.96) (2.58) (2.85)
G7-2:
     important votes -2.541 -1.222
(-1.15) (-0.81)
     other votes -2.093 -3.737 -4.776 -4.710 -5.928 -6.528*
(-0.55) (-1.06) (-1.33) (-1.25) (-1.62) (-1.80)
N 539 518 518 539 518 518
All columns include aid variables, trade variables, Blend, Population, GDP per capita, Freedom House, Democracy, War, year dummies,
and government fixed effects. Columns (4)-(6) also include Original Commitments, Portfolio age, and Portfolio age .
2
Estimation sample with 518 observations excludes China.
t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
 Reject the joint hypothesis that coefficients are zero (p=0.0191).
†
 Reject the joint hypothesis that coefficients are zero (p=0.0036).
‡45
Table 4B: Alternative UN alignment measures - with standardized coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
US:
     important votes 0.269** 0.137*
(2.99) (1.76)
     other votes 0.008 0.044 0.002 0.010 0.035 0.027
(0.17) (1.17) (0.04) (0.27) (1.00) (0.64)
Japan:
     important votes 0.020 -0.063
(0.12) (-0.54)
     other votes 0.121 0.189** 0.211** 0.175* 0.224** 0.255**
(1.29) (2.45) (2.65) (1.96) (2.58) (2.85)
G7-2:
     important votes -0.179 -0.086
(-1.15) (-0.81)
     other votes -0.059 -0.110 -0.140 -0.134 -0.174 -0.192*
(-0.55) (-1.06) (-1.33) (-1.25) (-1.62) (-1.80)
N 539 518 518 539 518 518
All columns include aid variables, trade variables, Blend, Population, GDP per capita, Freedom House, Democracy, War, year dummies,
and government fixed effects. Columns (4)-(6) also include Original Commitments, Portfolio age, and Portfolio age .
2
Estimation sample with 518 observations excludes China.
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0546
Table 5: World Bank Comparison – Using exact Original Commitments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:   ln World Bank disbursements
Original Commitments 0.915** 1.047** 0.915**
(11.27) (9.31) (5.76)
Portfolio age 0.0316 0.0102 0.0316
(0.35) (0.06) (0.14)
Portfolio age -0.00850 -0.00512 -0.00850
2
(-0.86) (-0.27) (-0.34)
SAL count 0.0302** 0.0305 0.0302
(2.05) (1.09) (1.10)
Project count -0.00496 -0.00307 -0.00496
(-1.24) (-0.69) (-0.57)
TA count -0.00752 -0.00143 -0.00752
(-0.55) (-0.09) (-0.28)
Blend 0.145 0.219 0.145 0.0126 -0.0796 0.0126
(1.56) (1.61) (0.66) (0.18) (-0.90) (0.08)
Population 0.616 -0.682 0.616 0.340 1.225 0.340
(0.95) (-0.43) (0.52) (0.84) (1.49) (0.50)
GDP per capita -0.400 -0.156 -0.400 -0.0578 0.0999 -0.0578
(-1.18) (-0.34) (-0.86) (-0.30) (0.38) (-0.15)
Freedom House 0.141** 0.158 0.141* 0.0303 0.117 0.0303
(2.76) (1.36) (1.72) (0.80) (1.52) (0.36)
Democracy -0.356** -0.333 -0.356 -0.178** -0.179 -0.178
(-2.37) (-1.40) (-1.09) (-2.02) (-1.04) (-0.65)
War -0.336** -0.0715 -0.336 -0.0982 -0.0157 -0.0982
(-2.04) (-0.64) (-1.19) (-1.03) (-0.16) (-0.44)
diffUSA 0.521** 0.952* 0.521 0.389** 0.587* 0.389
(2.44) (1.86) (1.02) (2.14) (1.74) (0.92)
diffG7-1 0.615** 0.217 0.615 0.220 -0.463 0.220
(2.10) (0.38) (0.86) (0.95) (-0.93) (0.42)
US aid (t-1) 0.0377** 0.0167 0.0377 0.0184* 0.00177 0.0184
(2.36) (0.70) (1.13) (1.91) (0.12) (0.72)
G7-1 aid (t-1) 0.156** 0.177** 0.156 0.00446 -0.0874 0.00446
(3.18) (2.51) (1.49) (0.10) (-1.57) (0.05)
Like-minded donor aid (t-1) 0.0625** 0.0134 0.0625 0.0429* 0.0267 0.0429
(2.13) (0.18) (0.96) (1.80) (0.55) (0.78)
US trade (t-1) 0.00960 0.0422 0.00960 -0.0102 -0.0386 -0.0102
(0.36) (0.93) (0.13) (-0.56) (-1.40) (-0.16)
G7-1 trade (t-1) 0.188 0.365** 0.188 0.101 0.123 0.101
(1.46) (2.12) (0.87) (1.11) (1.35) (0.49)
World trade (t-1) -0.139 -0.424 -0.139 -0.161* -0.331** -0.161
(-0.81) (-1.48) (-0.44) (-1.68) (-2.56) (-0.66)
N 2603 572 572 2603 572 572
All specifications include year dummies and government fixed effects.  Columns (1) and (4) include the full sample; columns (2)
and (5) are restricted to ADB member countries; columns (3) and (6) present results from bootstrap estimations drawing from the
full sample.  t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0547
Table 6: World Bank Comparison – Using approximate Original Commitments
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable:   ln World Bank disbursements
Original Commitments 0.776** 0.710** 0.776**
(11.84) (7.45) (5.25)
Portfolio age 0.155 -0.0245 0.155
(1.25) (-0.11) (0.52)
Portfolio age -0.0314** -0.0111 -0.0314
2
(-2.25) (-0.42) (-0.91)
Blend 0.0491 0.0688 0.0491
(0.64) (0.56) (0.24)
Population 0.530 0.151 0.530
(1.36) (0.16) (0.56)
GDP per capita -0.0531 0.113 -0.0531
(-0.28) (0.39) (-0.11)
Freedom House 0.0414 0.123 0.0414
(1.02) (1.67) (0.54)
Democracy -0.139 -0.168 -0.139
(-1.34) (-0.91) (-0.41)
War -0.132 0.0238 -0.132
(-1.29) (0.19) (-0.54)
diffUSA 0.339* 0.775** 0.339
(1.82) (2.08) (0.66)
diffG7-1 0.0726 -0.478 0.0726
(0.29) (-0.80) (0.15)
US aid (t-1) 0.0184 0.00125 0.0184
(1.60) (0.07) (0.58)
G7-1 aid (t-1) 0.00388 0.0000793 0.00388
(0.09) (0.00) (0.04)
Like-minded donor aid (t-1) 0.0489* 0.0477 0.0489
(1.95) (0.84) (0.84)
US trade (t-1) -0.00203 0.00311 -0.00203
(-0.12) (0.11) (-0.04)
G7-1 trade (t-1) 0.0824 0.158* 0.0824
(0.85) (1.86) (0.43)
World trade (t-1) -0.154 -0.406** -0.154
(-1.63) (-3.49) (-0.67)
N 2598 571 571
All specifications include year dummies and government fixed effects.  Column (1) includes the full
sample; column (2) is restricted to ADB member countries; column (3) presents results from
bootstrap estimations drawing from the full sample.  t statistics in parentheses based on government-
clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0548
Table 7: Common Agency Estimates
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
diffG7 -0.0325 -0.867
(-0.03) (-1.03)
STD diffG7 3.847* 2.318
(1.89) (1.23)
     * diffG7 0.209 1.680
(0.02) (0.22)
G7 aid 0.308 0.00822
(1.43) (0.05)
STD G7 aid 0.173 0.0828
(0.98) (0.66)
      * G7 aid 0.00985 -0.00337
(0.17) (-0.08)
G7 trade 0.325 0.275
(0.99) (1.21)
STD G7 trade 0.152 0.150
(0.55) (0.91)
     * G7 trade -0.0345 -0.0532
(-0.42) (-1.26)
N 539 539
All specifications include Blend, Population, GDP per capita, Freedom House, Democracy, War,
Like-minded donor aid, World trade, year dummies, and government fixed effects. (2) also includes
Original Commitments, Portfolio age, and Portfolio age .
2
t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0549
Table 8: Donor Interest Interaction Terms
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable:   ln ADB disbursements
US important votes 1.066* -0.103
(1.86) (-0.20)
     * low Japan other votes 0.400 0.357
(1.28) (1.32)
     * high Japan other votes -0.340 -0.0600
(-0.67) (-0.16)
Japan other votes 6.565** 6.644**
(3.15) (3.00)
US aid (t-1) -0.00368 0.0115
(-0.10) (0.46)
     * low Japanese aid 0.0724 0.0382
(1.50) (1.26)
     * high Japanese aid 0.112* 0.0690
(1.73) (1.57)
Japanese aid (t-1) 0.0163 -0.0813
(0.15) (-0.96)
US trade (t-1) 0.0350 0.0234
(0.52) (0.37)
     * low Japanese trade 0.0364 -0.0441
(0.61) (-0.85)
     * high Japanese trade -0.106** -0.00617
(-2.96) (-0.30)
Japanese trade (t-1) 0.0205 -0.0350
(0.47) (-0.95)
N 518 518
All specifications include Blend, Population, GDP per capita, Freedom House, Democracy, War,
diffG7-2, G7-2 aid, Like-minded donor aid, G7-2 trade, World trade, year dummies, and government
fixed effects. (2) also includes Original Commitments, Portfolio age, and Portfolio age .  "Low"
2
variables are binary identifiers of the lowest 50 observations; "high" variables are binary identifiers
of the highest 50 observations.  Estimation sample excludes China.
t statistics in parentheses based on government-clustered SEs.
* p<.1, ** p<.0550
Figure 1: Common Agency Marginal Effects, Formal and Informal Influence51
Figure 2: Common Agency Marginal Effects, Informal Influence Only52
Appendix A: UN Alignment Measure
Basic Notation:
a = country index
= i for recipient country
= d for donor country
k = index of UN roll call votes
t = year
t M = {important UNGA roll call votes in year t}
t N = {other UNGA roll call votes on regular session resolutions that passed in year t}
Define the possible votes cast as by country a in roll call vote k in year t as
akt v = !1 if a votes "No"
= 0 if a abstains or is absent
= 1 if a votes "Yes"
The voting alignment score of donor d and recipient i on UN roll call vote k in year t is
dikt dkt ikt D = 1 if v  = v
dkt ikt dkt = 0 if v  = !v  and v   0
= .5 otherwise
aakt This voting alignment score has the desirable property that D  =1 under all circumstances.  The
overall voting alignment on important UN votes for donor d and recipient i in year t is the average
over the applicable votes for the year:
(A1)
The overall voting alignment on other UN votes for donor d and recipient i in year t is the average
over the applicable votes for the year:
(A2)
The voting alignment measure used in the empirical analysis for donor d and recipient i in year t is
(A3)
When the alignment measure is for a group of donor countries, it is the unweighted average of the
measures for the member countries.53
Appendix B: Countries in estimation sample


































ADB borrowers (current and former) dropped from estimation sample due to data constraints:
Armenia
Chinese Taipei
Cook Islands
Georgia
Hong Kong, China
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed.States
Nauru
Palau
Timor-Leste
Turkmenistan